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Abstract 
When Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Com-
pany (Societas Europaea – SE) became effective on 8 October 2004, it offered 
existing publicly traded companies, for the first time, a choice between competing 
company laws, namely the national law of the company’s home state and the law of 
the supranational SE. Using an event study methodology, we analyse a unique 
dataset of publicly traded firms that have announced to re-incorporate under the SE 
Regulation. 
Keywords: event study, Societas Europaea, European Company, EC company law, 
incorporation, charter competition, regulatory competition, legal arbitrage. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
When it came to company law, European firms used not to have much choice. In 
most Member States of the European Community (EC) as well as the European 
Economic Area (EEA), a legal rule known as the ‘real seat doctrine’ restricted 
companies from incorporating in a jurisdiction other than that where their corporate 
headquarters were located. The situation began to change fundamentally when in 
1999 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that applying the real seat doctrine to 
companies from other EC Member States violated the freedom of establishment 
under the EC Treaty.1 The new case law effectively permitted company founders to 
choose a company law of their liking. It did not, however, provide the same freedom 
of choice to existing companies and their shareholders. There was no simple mecha-
nism for ‘reincorporating’ a firm, that is, for transforming a company established in 
one jurisdiction into a company governed by the law of another jurisdiction.2 Particu-
larly for public companies with a large and dispersed shareholder base it was 
virtually impossible to switch to another, more favourable company law. For them, 
the first choice to become available was between the national law of their respective 
home state and a new corporate form created by the EC: the European Company 
(Societas Europaea – SE). The European Company owes its existence not to the 
national laws of the Member States but to EC law itself. Council Regulation (EC) No 
2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE Regulation) entered into 
force on 8 October 2004. As soon as Member States had adopted the required trans-
position measures, public companies organised under the laws of an EEA Member 
State were able to reincorporate as an SE,3 thereby choosing to be governed by the 
SE Regulation.4 
                                                                                                                                               
1 See ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459; 
Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH [2002] 
ECR I-9919; Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art 
Ltd. [2003] ECR I-10155. 
2 Meanwhile, reincorporations among the EEA Member States should be possible by means of 
a cross-border merger into a shell company of the target jurisdiction under the Cross-Border 
Merger Directive 2005/56/EC. Member States were required to transpose the Directive into 
national law by 15 December 2007. 
3 Reincorporation can be accomplished by way of a merger between two or more public 
companies from different Member States (SE Regulation Art. 2(1)) or, more directly, by converting 
a public company into an SE; the latter method presupposes that the company has a subsidiary that 
has been governed by the law of another Member State for at least two years (SE Regulation Art. 
2(4)). 
4 It should be noted, however, that the SE company law differs only in part from that of the 
company’s home state because the SE Regulation frequently makes reference to the national law of 
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Since 2004, the new corporate form has been increasingly used by European firms 
(see Figure 1). While the number of SEs is still in the hundreds, it has so far shown 
exponential growth. Commentators have asserted potential advantages that the SE 
might offer to firms and their shareholders.5 In prior work, we have studied the 
validity of some of these claims by examining the motives of SE founders.6 Yet we 
know only little about whether and to what extent the alleged benefits of the SE 
corporate form actually materialise. In this regard, stock prices offer a valuable 
opportunity. If markets are at least reasonably efficient, the stock price should reflect 
the quality of the corporate governance structure insofar as it has an effect on the 
position of shareholders in the firm. 
Event studies are a proven research tool to exploit this source of information. 
They have been used extensively to evaluate reincorporation decisions in the United 
States where firms have enjoyed free choice among the state company laws for much 
more than a century. With the emergence of the SE, the event study methodology can 
now be applied to charter competition in Europe. To the best of our knowledge, the 
working paper version of this article has been the first to do this.7 Meanwhile, we 
have discovered eight more publicly traded firms that decided to reincorporate as an 
SE.8 Our results now build on 38 publicly traded firms, regarding which the intention 
to reincorporate under the SE Regulation was publicised before 1 February 2009. 
Based on this new sample, our original finding of positive abnormal returns follow-
ing the reincorporation decision still holds but no longer comes out at conventional 
levels of significance. Besides documenting the present state of knowledge, the 
article comments on the methodological difficulties of an event study five years after 
the SE’s introduction and offers an outlook for future research. 
In the remainder of the paper, we briefly consider the relevant literature (section 
2) before presenting our data (section 3) and the event study methodology relied on 
(section 4). Section 5 contains the main results regarding the abnormal returns on or 
around the reincorporation decision. In section 6, we discuss why we are no longer 
able to find significant results in our new sample. Section 7 concludes. 
                                                                                                                                               
5 See, e.g., L. Enriques, ‘Silence is Golden: The European Company Statute As a Catalyst for 
Company Law Arbitrage’, 4 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2004) p. 77; J. Reichert, 
‘Experience with the SE in Germany’, 4 Utrecht Law Review (2008) p. 22. 
6 H. Eidenmüller, A. Engert and L. Hornuf, ‘Incorporating Under European Law: The Societas 
Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage’, 10 European Business Organization Law Review 
(2009) p. 1. 
7 H. Eidenmüller, A. Engert and L. Hornuf, The Societas Europaea: Good News for European 
Firms, Law Working Paper No. 127 (European Corporate Governance Institute 2009). 
8 We have learned of four new firms from the (almost concurrent) study by F. Lamp, The Costs 
of Different European Corporate Governance Legislation: Evidence from the New Legal Form – 
Societas Europaea, Working Paper (2009), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411793>. 
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2. LITERATURE 
We are concerned with the economic consequences of company law choice, particu-
larly with regard to shareholders in public companies. Our research interest has 
important policy implications: which company law a firm elects may depend on 
substantive differences in legal rules between jurisdictions. Whoever is in control of 
the decision will opt for the jurisdiction that best serves his/her own interests. There-
fore, it is not a trivial question whether firms should be free to choose the company 
law under which they are organised. If reincorporating in another jurisdiction tends 
to harm certain stakeholders, the EC legislator may consider restricting firms’ 
choices. For instance, additional requirements could be imposed to prevent harmful 
reincorporations, such as exit rights for dissenting shareholders and creditors.9 Learn-
ing about the consequences of company law choice can also inform policy making at 
the national level. If Member States want to attract firms, or discourage firms from 
switching to another jurisdiction, they too should be interested in the effects of 
different legal rules on the various constituencies. 
The US has a long history of free company law choice. For more than a century, 
at least some states have actively engaged in what has come to be known as ‘charter 
competition’, i.e., competition among state jurisdictions to attract incorporations. 
Most of the time and until today, the tiny state of Delaware has dominated the market 
for incorporations. Its success has long been viewed with suspicion. The rival posi-
tions have originally been associated with Cary, who argued that states engaged in a 
‘race to the bottom’,10 and Winter, who took the opposite view that competition 
improved the quality of company law.11 It is important to note that the discussion in 
the US focuses on the agency problem between managers and shareholders in public 
companies. Accordingly, the quality of Delaware’s law – being the epitome of 
charter competition – was judged primarily by its impact on diversified shareholders. 
This common understanding and a growing confidence in market efficiency sug-
gested a way to put the conflicting propositions to an empirical test: if 
reincorporating in Delaware increased (decreased) stock market valuation, this would 
imply that charter competition benefitted (hurt) shareholders. 
                                                                                                                                               
9 At present, the SE Regulation does not provide any such safeguards. If an SE is formed by 
way of a cross-border merger, Art. 24 leaves it to the Member States to protect minority 
shareholders and creditors of the merging companies. Cross-Border Merger Directive Art. 4(1)(b) 
and (2), grants the Member States similar authority. To define its proper scope, the ECJ should 
consider the impact of reincorporations on the respective group. 
10  W. Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware’, 83 Yale Law Journal 
(1974) p. 663. 
11  R. Winter, ‘State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation’, 6 
Journal of Legal Studies (1977) p. 251. 
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Hyman was the first to take this cue and to conduct a (somewhat rough) analysis of 
stock returns of firms announcing their intention to reincorporate in Delaware.12 A 
survey by Bhagat and Romano counts a total of eight event studies on reincorporations 
in Delaware alone, with none of them finding significantly negative returns on the 
announcement date and four documenting positive returns that are statistically signifi-
cant.13 More recently, the event study methodology has been complemented by another 
approach seeking to detect how the market evaluates Delaware law.14 Daines.15 and 
Subramanian.16 examine whether Delaware companies generally enjoy a higher relative 
market valuation measured in terms of Tobin’s Q.17 after controlling for a number of 
other factors. Again, the evidence seems to be slightly in favour of Delaware, with 
Daines finding a significantly higher valuation and the Subramanian analysis, using a 
refined methodology and a different sample, yielding no significant results. 
As we pointed out in the introduction, choice of company law is a novel phe-
nomenon in Europe. What little empirical research there is has mostly focused on the 
evolving use of foreign company law by start-ups since 1999.18 For existing compa-
nies, the opportunity to opt out of the national company law under which they were 
established is an even more recent phenomenon. So far, reincorporating as an SE 
under European Community law has been the only relevant alternative to the national 
company law of the firm’s home jurisdiction.19 We documented in prior work that the 
SE has gained some popularity among European firms.20 In addition, we provided 
evidence on the reasons for choosing the SE form rather than incorporating under 
national company law.21 While the German Helaba bank early on presented data on 
                                                                                                                                               
12  A. Hyman, ‘The Delaware Controversy – The Legal Debate’, 4 Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law (1979) p. 368. 
13  S. Bhagat and R. Romano, ‘Empirical Studies of Corporate Law’, in S. Shavell and M. 
Polinsky, eds., Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol. 2 (Amsterdam, Elsevier 2007) p. 945. 
14  For a critical assessment of the event studies on Delaware law, see L. Bebchuk, A. Cohen 
and A. Ferrell, ‘Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?’, 90 California 
Law Review (2002) p. 1775. 
15  R. Daines, ‘Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?’, 62 Journal of Financial Economics 
(2001) p. 525. 
16  G. Subramanian, ‘The Disappearing Delaware Effect’, 20 Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization (2004) p. 32. 
17  Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value and the replacement cost of the firm’s 
(net) assets. 
18  See M. Becht, C. Mayer and H. Wagner, ‘Where Do Firms Incorporate’, 14 Journal of 
Corporate Finance (2008) p. 241; M. Becht, L. Enriques and V. Korom, ‘Centros and the Cost of 
Branching’, 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2009) p. 171. 
19  This will change gradually after the Cross-Border Merger Directive has been implemented 
in all Member States, see supra n. 2. 
20  H. Eidenmüller, A. Engert and L. Hornuf, ‘Die Societas Europaea: Empirische Bestands-
aufnahme und Entwicklungslinien einer neuen Rechtsform’, 53 Die Aktiengesellschaft (2008) p. 
721; Eidenmüller, Engert and Hornuf, supra n. 6. 
21  See Eidenmüller, Engert and Hornuf, supra n. 6. 
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abnormal returns surrounding the decision to reincorporate as an SE,22 our study and 
the almost concurrent one by Lamp are the first to analyse the stock price reaction 
based on a meaningful sample.23 
3. DATA 
Our objective is to detect abnormal stock returns surrounding the decision of a listed 
firm to reincorporate as a European Company. The first critical step is to identify the 
‘event day’, i.e., the point in time when the reincorporation decision was made 
public. We collected data on three events: the first public statement, by the firm itself 
or by a third party, on the firm’s decision to reincorporate, the shareholder meeting 
authorising the reincorporation, and finally, the registration of the SE in the company 
register. We relied on Thomson Knowledge and LexisNexis as primary sources to 
identify the event dates. For all firms, the intention to reincorporate was publicly 
announced by the firm, included in the invitation to the shareholder meeting or 
otherwise mentioned in media reports before the respective shareholder meeting took 
place. We chose the earliest publication as the relevant event day in all cases because 
it was then that the market first learned of the reincorporation plan. We obtained 
information on firms regarding which the intention to reincorporate became known 
to the public by 1 February 2009,24 even if these firms have not, or had not, yet been 
registered as SEs. For firms listed on German stock exchanges, we double-checked 
the dates against the inside information disclosure statements as recorded by the 
semi-official provider Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc-Publizität (DGAP). Finally, 
we requested information from and clarified discrepancies with the investor relations 
departments of the respective firms. 
As a result, we generated a dataset of 42 publicly traded stock companies which 
announced to reincorporate under the SE Regulation. Four firms were transformed 
into an SE just before or shortly after going public.25 After dropping these 4 cases, 
our ultimate sample consists of 38 firms. We rely on daily stock prices and indices 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The information on the method of incorporation, 
a possible transfer of the registered office, the (new) board structure, the number of 
employees and the industry branch of the firm were hand-collected from annual 
reports, special reports on the transfer of the registered office and the website of the 
European Trade Union Institute.26 
                                                                                                                                               
22  S. Rausch, Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft (SE) im Spiegel der Kapitalmärkte (Helaba 
Volkswirtschaft Research 2007). 
23  See Eidenmüller, Engert and Hornuf, supra n. 7, and Lamp, supra n. 8. 
24  Since February 2009, at least two more firms (Nordex and Tipp24) announced to 
reincorporate as an SE. Other candidates that might soon announce to reincorporate under the SE 
Regulation are M-Tech, Infineon and EADS. 
25  The four firms are Artemis Global Capital, Equipotential, Wacker Neuson and ENRO Energie. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44 Eidenmüller, Engert and Hornuf EBOR 11 (2010) 
For six observations, the intention to reincorporate was publicised on a week-
end.27 As securities were not traded over the weekend, we would not be able to 
calculate abnormal returns for the actual event and hence defined the event day as the 
following Monday. Furthermore, if we had knowledge that the information was 
revealed after the stock market had closed, we specified the following day as the true 
event day.28 
4. METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we briefly outline our methodology for assessing the market response 
to the reincorporation decision.29 We take the following three steps: first, we predict 
the returns for each day of the event window that we would expect if no event had 
occurred. Second, we subtract the expected returns from the actual returns to obtain 
abnormal returns. In our third and final step, we test whether the abnormal returns 
are statistically different from zero. 
There are different ways to calculate predicted returns.30 The most widely used 
are the market model and the constant mean return model. The latter assumes that the 
mean return of a given security is constant over time and hence uses the security’s 
mean return over a certain period of time as predicted return for the event window. 
By contrast, the market model presupposes a steady linear relationship between the 
returns of an individual security and the returns of the market. In so doing, the mar-
ket model tends to reduce the variance in abnormal returns because it can capture the 
portion of the individual security’s return that is related to the variation of the market 
return. We want to take advantage of this property and therefore adopt the market 
model. Since the predictive power of the market model depends primarily on how 
well the market index matches the market component in the returns of the security as 
measured by the R², we rely on different indices covering the various European stock 
markets and market segments. For instance, we choose from the DAX, MDAX, 
SDAX and TecDAX for the subsample of German companies. If a firm is part of one 
of these indices, as is the case for Allianz and BASF with respect to the DAX, we 
use this index. In the remaining cases, we choose the index that best approximates 
the firm’s size and industry. We estimate the predicted return parameters in a win-
dow from 230 to 30 days before the event date. To establish whether abnormal 
                                                                                                                                               
27  The six firms are Allianz, Conwert Immobilien Invest, HIT International Trading, MAN, 
Mensch und Maschine and Porsche Automobil Holding. 
28  This was the case for DVB Bank and Fotex Holding. 
29  For a more detailed account, see Eidenmüller, Engert and Hornuf, supra n. 7, at pp. 8-11. 
30  See S. Brown and J. Warner, ‘Measuring Security Price Performance’, 8 Journal of 
Financial Economics (1980) p. 205, at pp. 207-208; C. MacKinlay, ‘Event Studies in Economics 
and Finance’, 35 Journal of Economic Literature (1997) p. 13, at pp. 17-19. 
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returns are significantly different from zero we apply a t-test.31 and – as a robustness 
check – a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test.32 
5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Information is sometimes not disclosed to the market at one distinct point in time. It 
may leak out before and disseminate after the event day. Also, we are often not able 
to observe when exactly the decision to reincorporate became known to the public 
for the first time. For instance, rumours spread some days before the official press 
release, or there may not even be a specific announcement by the firm that is clearly 
communicated to the market. To increase the chance of capturing the abnormal 
returns associated with a piece of information, it has become standard practice to 
consider event windows of more than one day around the event date and calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over those timeframes. 
We find both positive and negative abnormal returns for individual firms in our 
sample. The results for the event date (0), the day before (-1) and after (+1) the event 
date as well as for the time window from day -1 through day +1 are reported in the 
Appendix. Table 2 contains the average abnormal returns in our sample. The event 
date 0 yields a modest average abnormal return of .2 percent, which falls far short of 
any significance level. The picture brightens somewhat when we cumulate average 
returns over broader timeframes. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) rise 
to .9 percent as we extend the event window from the event date 0 up to day +5. 
While these CAARs still fail to reach even the 10 percent level of significance, the p-
values decrease. This is the remnant of the result in an earlier version of this study, in 
which we did find significant positive CAARs for all time windows beginning on 
day 0 and ending at days 0 to 8. In the subsequent section we will examine why we 
fail to confirm this earlier finding with our larger sample. As Figure 2 depicts, the 
average stock market valuation of the firms in our sample increased around the event 
date. Given the behaviour of our test statistics on and after the event date, we still 
believe that ‘something is going on’.33 
In contrast to our results, the concurrent study by Lamp claims to find signifi-
cantly positive CAARs.34 However, this conclusion rests only on the timeframes 
                                                                                                                                               
31  See S. Brown and J. Warner, ‘Using Daily Stock Returns – The Case of Event Studies’, 14 
Journal of Financial Economics (1985) p. 3, at pp. 7-8. 
32  For non-parametric tests in the event study context, see MacKinlay, supra n. 30, at p. 32. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test goes back to F. Wilcoxon, ‘Individual Comparisons by Ranking 
Methods’, 1 Biometrics Bulletin (1945) p. 80. 
33  A difference-in-means test of the CAARs 30 days before and after the event day comes out 
at the 5 percent level. This may be seen as a hint that the market valuation increases on or around 
the event day. 
34  Lamp, supra n. 8. 
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from -20 to +1 and -2 to 0. Other intermediate event windows in Lamp’s analysis 
yield insignificant or significantly negative CAARs,35 which is in line with the results 
reported in Table 2. While news of the reincorporation decision may leak out before 
the information is published, we believe that at least some effect should occur on or 
after the event date. Unfortunately, Lamp does not report results for any post-event 
windows, making a direct comparison infeasible. 
Figure 2: Cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
Table 2: Cumulative average abnormal returns.36 
                                                                                                                                               
35  Lamp, supra n. 8, at p. 21. 
36  We use robust standard errors to account for possible heteroskedasticity. 
t-test Wilcoxon rank-sum test window CAARt 
t-value p-value z-value p-value 
-1 to +1 .006 1.09 28.1 .43 66.9 
-2 to +2 .005 .77 44.4 .24 81.1 
-3 to +3 .005 .60 55.5 .33 74.4 
-4 to +4 .009 1.02 31.5 1.04 30.0 
-5 to +5 .010 .91 37.0 1.34 18.0 
-5 to -1 .000 .03 99.7 .53 79.7 
-4 to -1 .002 .27 78.5 .44 65.8 
-3 to -1 .000 -.07 94.7 .27 78.9 
-2 to -1 -.001 -.24 81.0 -1.17 24.3 
0 .002 .62 54.0 .07 94.8 
0 to 1 .004 .96 34.3 .31 75.5 
0 to 2 .006 1.23 22.6 .54 58.7 
0 to 3 .005 1.04 30.5 .78 43.8 
0 to 4 .007 1.37 17.8 1.20 23.2 
0 to 5 .009 1.43 16.2 1.28 19.9 
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6. ASSESSING THE PRESENT FINDINGS 
In the prior version of our analysis, we found significantly positive CAARs ranging 
from 1.2-3.0 percent in a sample of 30 firms.37 Why did we lose statistical signifi-
cance when we moved to a larger sample consisting of 38 firms? One possible 
explanation, of course, is that reincorporation does not affect market valuation and 
that our previous results were spurious. For instance, it may be that in our old sample 
other news was often disclosed simultaneously with the decision to reincorporate. 
Although we cannot rule out this possibility, we do not believe that it was behind our 
old findings. As long as event days do not cluster, other news revealed on the event 
day can be positive as well as negative. Its effect should cancel out. To distort the 
results, concurrent information would have had to pull systematically in one direc-
tion. 
In any event, adding eight firms to the sample (and correcting eight event days) 
made our CAARs drop to .4-.9 percent. While 38 observations can be a sufficiently 
large sample to conduct an event study, the power of the tests decreases rapidly as 
the magnitude of abnormal returns falls. For a sample size of 40, a Monte Carlo 
simulation by MacKinley reveals that the power of a t-test decreases from 100 to 35 
percent if abnormal returns fall from 2 percent to .5 percent, assuming that the 
standard deviation is .02.38 Thus, CAARs of 1.2-3.0 percent in our old sample of 
thirty firms gave the t-tests statistical power that is noticeably reduced for CAARs of 
.4-.9 percent in a somewhat larger sample of 38 firms.39 The probability of commit-
ting a type II error – failing to reject a null hypothesis when it should have been 
rejected – rises considerably. It follows that our new result should not be read as 
evidence against the hypothesis that firms’ decision to reincorporate as an SE leads 
to positive abnormal returns on average. Given the lack of statistical power, the loss 
of significance only implies that there is no valid evidence in favour of a positive 
stock market reaction. 
Consequently, the key question is why CAARs in our larger sample are much 
smaller than in our original study. We attribute this to the greater problems in identi-
fying the correct event day for reincorporations of less prominent firms. It is often 
quite uncertain when news of the reincorporation decision first hit the market. Even 
with an announcement by the firm, it was sometimes hard to determine the release 
date. In a number of cases, the earliest event date we could obtain was some type of 
media coverage, including reports from internet sources. We cannot be sure that we 
have actually spotted the first occurrence of the information. All of these difficulties 
increased as we discovered additional firms because they were typically smaller and 
less well-known than the ones in our old sample. Missing the correct event day, and 
                                                                                                                                               
37  Eidenmüller, Engert and Hornuf, supra n. 7, at p. 15. 
38  MacKinlay, supra n. 30. 
39  MacKinlay, supra n. 30, at p. 29. 
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hence any abnormal returns associated with the decision to reincorporate, is more of 
a risk for the new firms in our sample. 
Another, related point is that the market reaction is likely to differ depending on 
how the information on the possible reincorporation is revealed. A posting on a 
market information website may amount to little more than a market rumour. Even a 
newspaper article can be misleading, as in the case of Siemens AG, where in April 
2007 the weekly magazine ‘Euro am Sonntag’ reported plans for a reincorporation, 
which later turned out to be the result of a misunderstanding during an interview with 
a company representative. Because reports from third parties involve a greater degree 
of uncertainty, one would expect such information to be discounted by investors as 
compared to statements from the firms themselves. But even when firms announced 
their decision to reincorporate as an SE, the communication was often far from clear-
cut. Some announcements were only made orally during press conferences, others 
through a mere post on the company website, still others consisted of no more than 
an agenda item on the invitation to the shareholder meeting. In all these cases it may 
have taken a couple of days or even weeks for the information to spread. Its price 
impact on the event day should therefore be much weaker than its total effect over 
time. Again, the new firms that were added later are likely to suffer more from this 
problem because we had already combed news providers like Reuters and DGAP for 
our old sample. Our old dataset, therefore, covered most firms with a well-defined 
announcement that was publicised on a specific date. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our analysis of the market reactions to the decision to reincorporate under European 
law has led to a sobering result: in contrast to the findings in a precursor to this 
article, the positive abnormal returns on and after the event day cease to be statisti-
cally significant in our new and extended sample. The available data as of 1 February 
2009 do not yet allow a reliable conclusion as to whether the new European Com-
pany appeals not only to firms and their managers (which we know) but also to 
diversified shareholders of public companies. The loss of significance in our results 
can be attributed to the lower quality of the data for those firms that we learned of 
only after our working paper was published. Our original results may thus have been 
diluted by new bad data. Alternatively, they may have simply been wrong in the first 
place. At present, there is no way of distinguishing which of these two possibilities 
applies. We will have to wait until more publicly traded firms opt into the new legal 
form and, accordingly, provide us with a larger sample and more statistical power. 
If significantly positive abnormal returns can be re-established, this will carry a 
general policy lesson: a broader range of company law choice for European firms 
may open up new opportunities and help to unlock hidden value. One implication 
would be that the EC should keep experimenting with enhancing company law 
choice as well as offering additional company types, such as the European Private 
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Company that is presently being contemplated.40 A larger sample would also enable 
us to investigate the important follow-up question of what drives the market’s appre-
ciation – if any – of the SE. We have some evidence that avoiding or mitigating the 
effects of mandatory worker co-determination laws plays an important role in the 
choice of the SE corporate form.41 However, firms for which this motive may have 
been relevant do not exhibit higher CAARs than others; rather, the converse is true.42 
If SE incorporations keep their pace, we will be able to study this and other impor-
tant issues in a not-too-distant future. 
                                                                                                                                               
40  See the recent Commission proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European 
Private Company, COM (2008) 396 final. 
41  Eidenmüller, Engert and Hornuf, supra n. 6, at pp. 26-27, 29-31. 
42  This point is elaborated for our old sample in Eidenmüller, Engert and Hornuf, supra n. 7, at 
p. 20. 
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Table 3: Firm-level abnormal returns 
                                          Day (t)              -1                0                1           -1 to 1  
Firm         
Allianz -.0054 -.0292*** .0034 -.0312 
Bauholding Strabag  -.0170 -.0039 .0108 -.0101 
BASF .0077 -.0028 -.0000 .0049 
Betbull .0004 -.0149 -.0014 .0016 
Catalis -.0158 -.0149 -.0188 -.0495*** 
Colexon Energy .0246 .0762* -.0376 .0632 
Conwert Immobilien Invest .0456*** -.0347*** -.0088 .0021 
DVB Bank -.0035 .0147 .0147 .0007 
Elcoteq .0139 -.0079 .0017 .0077 
Dexia .0088 .0264 .0016 .0368 
Eurofins Scientific .0057 .0021 -.0130 -.0052 
Fotex Holding .0325** -.0320** .0293* .0298 
Fresenius -.0153 .0039 -.0106 -.0221 
GfK .0477** .0076 .0173 .0726* 
Graphisoft .0022 .0027 .0131 .0179 
HIT International Trading .0026 .0010 .0027 .0063*** 
I.M. Skaugen -.0181 .0061 -.0015 -.0135 
IMW Immobilien -.0030 -.0032 -.0031 -.0093*** 
Interseroh .0086 -.0205 .0160 .0041 
Klöckner & Co .0152 -.0073 .0180 .0258 
Linde .0049 .0299** .0185 .0533** 
MAN -.0058 -.0013 -.0087 -.0158** 
Mensch und Maschine -.0026 -.0008 .0011 -.0023 
Navigator Equity Solutions -.0056 -.0017 -.0079 -.0151*** 
Norddeutsche Affinerie -.0086 -.0174 -.0159 -.0419*** 
Nordea -.0048 -.0032 -.0002 -.0082* 
Odfjell .0010 -.0134 .0056 .0022 
Porsche Automobil Holding .0129 .0162 .0723a .1015* 
Prosafe -.0254 -.0053 .0192 -.0115 
Q-Cells -.0132 .0447** .0055 .0370 
SCA Hygiene Products .0042 -.0141 -.0374* -.0473 
Scor .0025 .0226 .0374*** .0625** 
SGL Carbon -.0212 .0171 .0155 .0113 
Solon -.0289 .0059 -.0087 -.0316 
Songa Offshore .0035 -.0023 -.0023 -.0010 
Surteco -.0008 -.0019 -.0001 -.0028* 
Sword Group -.0006 .0170 -.0288 -.0123 
Wiener Privatbank .0000 -.0008 .0001 -.0006 
*** indicates the 1 percent, ** the 5 percent and * the 10 percent level of significance. 
